Oil Prices and Lessons for the Press from a Failure of Expertise
What we might learn from all those predictions of $150 per barrel
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On March 12, less than two weeks into the war on Iran, the Wall Street Journal headlined a Goldman Sachs prediction that oil prices could reach $150 per barrel if the Strait of Hormuz remained closed on April 1. This followed an AP story to the same effect the previous day, citing an analyst report from Wood MacKenzie. Two weeks later, The Times of London cited a JP Morgan prediction of $150 oil if the Strait was not opened by May 1. The same day that story appeared, a similar UBS report was featured by MarketWatch.
In the event, the highest wartime daily close for oil was $115 in late April, even though, under Trump’s deal with Iran, the Strait may not be fully open until July 17, or even later. Yesterday, oil prices fell to nearly pre-war levels, while Strait traffic remained quite limited. Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, UBS and others all got it wrong. And the press amplified their errant calls, badly serving readers. This week I want to talk about what the journalism business might learn from this episode.
What they missed
Let’s start in the world of oil, where a number of solid stories have appeared on what the analysts mistook. There’s this one from Barron’s from early this month, and this one (gift link) from the Wall Street Journal a week later. The Barron’s piece, almost humorously, can be summed up by saying supply turned out to be higher and demand lower than analysts had expected. Of course, predicting supply and demand is analysts’ most basic job.
The Journal piece is more nuanced (and worth reading if you find the substance here interesting), but largely to the same effect, including noting the impact of drawdowns from strategic petroleum reserves. But that should hardly have been unexpected: I remember a graduate school exam question more than 45 years ago that focused on calculating the optimal use of such reserves to confront an oil shock.
What we had here was a failure of expertise, compounded by a failure of journalism in amplifying it.
Lots of people have heard screenwriter William Goldman’s Hollywood motto, “Nobody knows anything” (sometimes more colorfully attributed to Sam Goldwyn, the “G” in MGM, as “Nobody knows nuthin’”). This latest adventure should remind us all that, while that isn’t literally true, its applicability ranges widely.
Where does that leave reporters and editors? There seem to me to be a number of lessons:
Beware interested parties, and herd effects. The first prominent warning of $150 wartime oil prices came not from a financial firm but from the energy minister of Qatar, who made it in an interview with the Financial Times just a week into the war. He asserted this could “bring down the economies of the world.” Of course, the Qataris weren’t disinterested observers of the conflict. They had tried to mediate before war broke out, felt caught in the middle, and were, when the minister sounded his alarm, worried about just the sort of attacks on their own infrastructure that soon followed. Journalists, knowing this, would tend to discount a prediction from such a source. But they needed to go father, and to guard against putting more credibility in the same prediction when it was echoed by others.
Resist the temptation of the outlier. This case also serves as another reminder of a truism in our business: that the most dramatic story is not always—and may even rarely be—the smartest one. In the first hours and days, the undeniable facts of the war were plenty dramatic: the killing of many key Iranian leaders, the closing of the Strait, the bombast from US leaders and their apparent manipulation by the Israelis. But as initial headlines fade in a crisis, journalists need to guard against the peril of becoming adrenaline junkies, latching on to the next claim of even more drama ahead, and the next after that. Gasoline going from under three dollars a gallon to over four almost overnight, and the impact on the lives of millions, is a huge story; it should not be necessary to breathlessly anticipate five dollars.
Have the courage to revisit your own coverage. One of the ways to take care in this regard is to follow the bouncing ball of what you have been reporting. When the predictions of $150 per barrel by April 1 failed to come even close to materializing, the same predictions for May 1 should have been received with greater skepticism.
Reporters have generally figured out that Trump is always saying things are “two weeks away,” and have gotten better at discounting his musings along those lines. The same lesson needs to be applied to other actors as well. Beyond this, a degree of self-criticism is in order; it might even boost our collective credibility if more stories noted how previous predictions we shared have failed to eventuate.
Keep score for next time. Finally, as I have said before with respect to politicians who come on live TV shows and lie, there needs to be a degree of accountability for sources whose mistakes we have amplified. To be sure, there is an important moral distinction between a lying politician and an errant analyst, but neither serve readers, listeners or viewers well. Neither need to be afforded our platforms as easily or as often.
One non-lesson that may surprise you. It’s become fashionable in journalism to decry coverage that is predictive rather than covering things as-they-are. I share that critique when it comes to partisan politics. What much of political coverage fails to grasp is that what is most significant for readers is not who is likely to win an election at any given moment but rather what is at stake.
Beyond politics, however, I am less persuaded. In sports, and in business, readers are looking mostly for reporting that yields an intelligent guide to future events; the basic facts of what has just happened is the stuff of commodity news. My own journalism hero, Barney Kilgore, felt that one of the highest purposes of journalism generally was to prepare its consumers for tomorrow. The problem with all those stories of $150 oil wasn’t that they were asking the wrong question, it was that they were offering the wrong answer.



As a former energy writer for the WSJ (and AP-Dow) I couldn't agree more.
But the problem, I believe, isn't in the lack of expertise or historical perspective among 'analysts.' The problem is the lack of expertise or historical perspective among those reporting such things.
It's times like this I in fact miss my old colleague, David Bird, who kept his own personal database of oil prices going back, I believe, to at least the Gulf War.
First of all, all it would have taken is a search for the all-time intraday high for the price of crude oil, which the Energy Information Administration and World Bank Group noted was $147 - NEVER $150 - in July 2008 (in the midst of 'The Great Recession'). https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/60591434652912502-0190022009/original/AirTransportTheOilPriceSpikeof2008.pdf
Energy, like all commodities, is a supply-and-demand story, and has always been.
It is known that restrictions of supply - be it weather, or shipping 'bottlenecks,' war, or even a coordinated reduction in output (by OPEC+) - will cause prices to spike, just as a predicted (key word) lack of demand.
As a reporter in Texas before my Dow Jones experience, I never forgot talking to an oil company exec (not T. Boone, though he and I had a few conversations prior) who explained to me he was getting into 'plastics,' primarily 'pvc,' because 'I can make money at $80 per barrel, and I can make money at $40 per barrel).
There was a time, in fact, in the early aughts when I was writing for AP-Dow and WSJ, that I recall around our desk we traded dollar bills because the price of crude was so low - 'spiking' at one time to $38 per barrel, with the price of gasoline past $1.50 and heading to $2.50, with everyone expecting it would eventually go back to $1.50...
It has always amused as well as amazed me, for instance, that a cold snap in December or January causes heating oil prices to spike that day: when the price that's spiking is for delivery 3 months later.
Similarly, I've been amused and amazed at the price of gasoline spiking, predictably and interestingly between Memorial Day and Labor Day in the U.S. ('Peak driving season, as gasoline analyst Phil Flynn used to always note). The reason it amuses me is because I know those barrels of oil being refined into a Reformulated Blending stock (RBOB) for gasoline in May to September were priced, paid for, and awaiting delivery from three months before until at the latest early April.
Heating oil prices - based on delivery before the predicted cold snap, and priced on anticipated demand (like all commodities) - shouldn't really spike the day a cold snap hits or even is predicted. Because those barrels of crude bound for heating oil have already been paid for.
Similarly, gasoline - summer stock, RBOB - prices shouldn't really spike AT THE PUMP between Memorial Day and Labor Day, except if demand is expected (it usually is) ahead of delivery of those barrels, meaning it should reflect the price of the crude being refined months before.
The average consumer seems mystified by how energy companies manage to make record profits during low-demand periods like Covid.
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/04/the-big-chart-price-of-oil-through-history/
The answer is simple: the profit margin. If gasoline were priced near where oil has been priced, even at $115 per barrel, it would (have been) more like $3.00 per barrel than $5. In the same month as world crude oil prices hit $147/bbl, July 2008, gasoline's highest average price was STILL not $5 per gallon. It was $4.06.
In fact, the average price of a gallon of gasoline in the U.S. hasn't been below $2.00 per gallon since May 2020, at $1.87. Before that, it was below $2.00 NOT during the first Trump administration, contrary to much touted and repeated but not ever fact-checked claims, but at the tail end of the second Obama administration, at $1.969, in March 2026 - before the first election of Donald Trump. And that's according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration's own data.
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/leafhandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m
If energy writers spent more time explaining pricing - and profit margins - on commodities to readers/consumers than trying to be first with the most outrageous, enraging headline, and asking analysts 'why?' instead of 'what?,' consumers and readers and, I believe, news organizations would be much better serving. Especially if they wrote with a historical, rather than histrionic, perspective.
But headlines get clicks. Drama attracts. Research, understanding, explanation, not so much.
With the initial invasion of Iraq - who was only allowed to sell oil on the market in a U.N.-brokered 'oil-for-food' deal, I was for some time working on a feature noting that the cost of gasoline was a 'hidden tax' on the war in Iraq. It never came to fruition for a variety of reasons - but not, thankfully, because analysts like John Kilduff or Bill Gallagher wouldn't talk to me.
Similarly to Iran, Iraqi oil was otherwise banned from sale on the open market.
Saudi Arabia - the defacto head of OPEC+ - and the only place besides Qatar and Kuwait the U.S. essentially moved its bases to from first Iran, then Iraq, took as its own BOTH Iraq and Iran's output quotas within OPEC. Meaning it alone could sell as much as its own quota, and that of the other two countries.
With the invasion and collapse of Saddam's regime in Iraq, Karbil - in self-proclaimed Kurdistan - became the main base of oil production in Iraq. But neither Saudi Arabia, nor Turkey, nor Iran, nor Iraq wanted to see an economically viable, independent Kurdistan.
The 'Oil Law' passed in Iraq before the U.S. withdrew most of its forces gave U.S. energy companies 'first dibs' on oil extraction in Iraq.
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna23638400
Similar to what the current administration appears to be trying to do with Venezuela.
Saudi Arabia had said before the Iran bombing last year, and in fact during the first administration of the U.S.'s current President, that $90/bbl was ideal for maintaining profits for OPEC, including Russia and Venezuela.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_a.htm
They cut output to try and cause that. But demand - during and after Covid - never recovered. The average cost of a barrel of crude until last June was between $60-$50/bbl. And still, gasoline was closer to $3.00 (either side of), ranging from $2.59 (I never saw) to $3.50 (definitely saw).
With oil at more than half below what it had been during The Great Recession, Russia sanctioned, Venezuela's reserve capacity questioned, Iran sanctioned, and Iraq struggling to get its export production online - including Karbil (key because its oil was not in the Strait but delivered by pipeline to the export port of Ceyhan in Turkey) - gasoline should have been closer to $2 per gallon than $3.
https://www.wto.org/spanish/res_s/publications_s/wtr10_forum_s/wtr10_kilian_s.htm
Meaning with a 'spike' in the price of crude oil, caused by fears of restriction of supply (that wasn't really part of the world's oil supply for most years) it should have maybe gone up to $3.50, not $5.
But readers/consumers belive what they hear, and what they see, and understanding they're being gouged doesn't seem to prevent it.
As for analysts being experts, just before the Iraq invasion under GW Bush, I distinctly recall reading a Merrill Lynch forecast of oil at $18 per barrel.
Smart piece.